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NATIONAL SECURITY KEY TO RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

THE occupation by Russian forces of key points in Bulgaria which were being used by Germany gives a new fillip to the discussion aroused by some observers who, while opposing Nazism, are asking whether a victorious Russia will dominate post-war Europe. Since their fears, as noted last week, could affect the character of the peace the Allies make with Germany, it is essential to scrutinize them frankly.

RUSSIA'S AIMS IN EUROPE. Recent military developments on the eastern front—Russia's invasion of Rumania, Finland's withdrawal from the war, and now the surrender of Bulgaria—do not portend any fundamental change in earlier estimates of Moscow's aims in Europe. So far as the official record indicates, the U.S.S.R. does not seek to acquire new territory on the continent. Its announced territorial claims remain limited to the Baltic states, eastern Poland, and the section of Finland it obtained under the Moscow treaty of 1940 that terminated the first Russo-Finnish war—all areas which were part of the Tsarist Empire before its break-up in 1917. Nor has the Soviet government yet indicated that it intends to extract the last pound of flesh from such German satellites as Finland and Rumania. On the contrary, the impression of foreign representatives in Moscow is that the demands of the Russians fall considerably short of "unconditional surrender." And the treatment of areas so far liberated by the Russian Army—notably in Poland and Rumania—is, according to the reports of American correspondents on the spot, of a character to assure the population that their religious beliefs and economic practices will not be disturbed by the occupying forces.

Does this mean that the Russians are not concerned about the internal situation of the liberated countries, and will withdraw unconditionally once Germany has been defeated? No, it does not—any more than it could be said that Britain and the United States have no concern about the internal situation in

Italy, or even that of our allies, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Norway. London and Washington have displayed a lively interest in the future political development of France, and have taken an active part—in the opinion of some, an unsatisfactory part—in the affairs of Italy. It is doubtful that they would feel compensated for the military and economic effort they are now making for the liberation of Europe, or would feel reassured about post-war prospects, if governments inimical to them should suddenly emerge in Paris or Rome. The Russians, for their part, are determined that, when they do transfer to native régimes the administration of areas where they are now fighting the Germans, these régimes will not be hostile either to Russia as a nation or to its political, economic and social institutions.

It does not follow that governments in each of the countries bordering on Russia are to be composed solely of Communists or fellow-travelers. The Russians have not opposed the agreement concluded by Marshal Tito with Yugoslav Prime Minister Dr. Subashitch, appointed by King Peter of Yugoslavia, and have not rejected the aid given to their cause by King Michael of Rumania, whose peace emissaries are now in Moscow. What the Russians have firmly opposed has been any attempt by the satellite countries to masquerade as friends of the United Nations while retaining their ties with Germany and continuing, *sub rosa*, to inflict loss of life and matériel on Russia. A policy of double-talk on the part of Axis satellites would presumably be just as objectionable to Britain and the United States as to Russia.

DOES MOSCOW CLAIM ITS OWN "ORBIT"? Does this mean that Russia claims an exclusive sphere of influence over Eastern Europe and the Balkans? Are we on the point of witnessing the formation of what Walter Lippmann calls "orbits," with Russia in full control of areas east of Germany, leaving the "Atlantic Community" to its Western Allies, and the

Far East to China? Current developments give no evidence of such a trend, which in any case is impracticable in an air-minded world. Russia, it is true, has a special interest in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, just as the United States has in Latin America, and Britain in France and the Low Countries. But Moscow does not appear to be excluding its Allies from participation in the affairs of states bordering on the U.S.S.R., and is meanwhile taking an interest in other areas of the world. Although in the Polish-Russian controversy, as yet unsettled, Moscow at first played a lone hand, more recently it has consulted Britain and the United States concerning the terms of its truce with Finland and its declaration of war on Bulgaria (which up to September 5 had been at war with Western powers but not with Russia). While there is no doubt that the Soviet government considers Eastern Europe and the Balkans as an area where its future security is particularly at stake, it has shown itself ready to consider measures of world security now under discussion at Dumbarton Oaks. The greater the degree of confidence that can be established between Russia and the other United Nations—and this can be done only by day to day dealings, not merely by documents—the more promising will be the prospect of post-war collaboration in Europe. The more we hesitate, on the other hand, to support a security organization that would require us to take military action outside the Western Hemisphere, the more we actually encourage Russia to rely on its own strength and on special arrangements with border states to protect itself against future aggression by Germany.

WILL RUSSIA PROMOTE COMMUNISM? Is Russia, however, promoting Communist doctrines in the liberated areas, and will it use its influence to spread Communism beyond its security zone? In 1940 the Russians gravely miscalculated the temper of the Finns. Today, they are showing far more penetrating understanding of border countries, conditions in which may differ from those existing in Russia in 1917. The respect for religion and private property expressed by the groups in Poland and Yugoslavia

that have collaborated with Russia, and the comportment of the Russians in Rumania would indicate that Moscow is inclined to adapt its policy to circumstances, provided always the fundamental condition is fulfilled that the governments of border countries maintain genuinely friendly relations with Russia.

But, quite aside from any positive action Russia might take on behalf of its own doctrines, we cannot escape the fact that political and economic conditions in the wake of war may well encourage the most radical tendencies among peoples who, having lost all but life, now have nothing to lose except a life of hardship and uncertainty. This is particularly true of most of the countries of Eastern Europe, where people lived close to the margin even before the war; but reports from Italy indicate that conditions bordering on chaos, always conducive to revolution, may not be restricted to any geographic area. It is entirely credible that native Communists will take advantage of existing unrest to assume greater power and influence—but, if they do, it will be because the removal of Nazi rule will have left a vacuum of authority.

Today, in spite of many disillusionments, it is still to Britain and the United States, but especially to this country, that the peoples of Europe are looking for leadership as they face, with the gravest anxiety, the manifold problems of the post-war period. If we fail to fulfill the expectations we have aroused by our condemnation and defeat of armed totalitarianism, we shall have to blame not Russia, but our own incapacity to assume moral leadership. We have convinced the world that we possess unrivaled talents for industrial production and military organization in time of war. What do we and the British intend to do to demonstrate that we also command sufficient talents to carry forward the tasks of reconstruction? It is none too early to answer this question, which one must hope is on the agenda of the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in Quebec.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second in a series on Europe's problems as seen from the United States.)

TITO'S SUCCESS FORESHADOWS POLITICAL ROLE OF UNDERGROUND

The Red Army's long-anticipated arrival in the Balkans and its junction with the Yugoslav Partisans on September 7 reinforces with military cooperation the close political tie between Moscow and Marshal Tito. This cooperation will undoubtedly play an important part in speeding the defeat of the Nazis in southeastern Europe. By reaching across Yugoslavia to meet the Russians at the Bulgarian frontier, the Partisans destroyed the only important railroad running north and south in the Balkans and trapped an estimated 250,000 Germans in the southern part of the peninsula and the Adriatic and Aegean islands. But serious as the defeat of these

Balkan forces will be for Germany, the strategic loss of Bulgaria may be felt even more keenly in the Reich since the Red Army is already using this former Axis satellite as a base for its attack on Hungary, the last remaining part of the German system of outer defenses. Thus Germany faces invasion over the traditional Danubian route at the very moment when the Western Allies are attacking the Siegfried Line. Moreover, as the Russians move toward Germany from the southeast, their progress may be hastened by the fact that the route for American lend-lease supplies has been shortened as a result of the Red Army's occupation of Bulgaria's Black Sea bases.

TITO WINS RECOGNITION. The long-range political consequences of the Red Army's arrival in the Balkans promise to be as important as the immediate military results. It is worth noting that in this region, long the scene of conflict among the European powers, Britain—now the only possible competitor for prestige—has given full approval to Russia's new position. This is indicated by the continued presence of Randolph Churchill at Tito's headquarters and Prime Minister Churchill's meeting with Tito in Rome on August 13. As the battle for south-eastern Europe moves into its final stage, therefore, Russia is playing the uncontested role in the Balkans that has traditionally been the goal of its foreign policy regardless of the régime in power.

The precise form Russia's post-war influence throughout the Balkans will take is not yet entirely clear. But in Yugoslavia the shape of the nation's political future has emerged and been officially recognized in the agreement reached on June 16 by the government-in-exile under its new Premier, Dr. Ivan Subashitch, and Marshal Tito and supplemented by ensuing declarations from both parties. The significance of these statements lies in the fact that they mark Tito's complete victory over the government-in-exile, which had formerly publicly condemned the Partisans and supported their Chetnik opponents under General Mikhailovitch. In what amounts to a complete reversal of policy for the exiled régime, the Subashitch cabinet on August 8 issued a declaration declaring that it recognized Tito's army as the "highest expression" of the nation's resistance, called on all Yugoslavs to join these forces, and expressed the view that Tito's political organization in liberated areas of Yugoslavia is essential in carrying on the war. The government also abandoned its intransigent position with respect to the monarchy, and agreed that the question of the future of the king should be postponed until it could be submitted to a post-war election.

As a result of this agreement, the Partisans have registered a triumph for another of Europe's resistance movements as opposed to exiled régimes. There can be little doubt that the government formed in Yugoslavia after the Germans are expelled will follow the pattern being set in France, where exiles—regardless of the conscientiousness and skill with which they have performed their duties—are being replaced by men who lived through the years of enemy occupation and are intimately acquainted with the temper of the people. It can be expected, therefore, that post-war Yugoslavia will be shaped along lines desired by the Partisans rather than by the present exiled government, despite the latter's belated efforts to win the confidence of the resistance movement. Under Partisan leadership the nation's political structure will undoubtedly be federal, with Croats and Slovenes assigned more important roles than in pre-war Yugoslavia, and the régime in power will stand for a high degree of nationalization of commercial and industrial property. Moreover, the Yugoslav Communist party, enjoying the new prestige won through its important position in the war, can be expected to be a major political force. In foreign affairs, this new Yugoslavia will be closely linked to the U.S.S.R., and will demand rectifications of its northern border with Italy.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT NOT ENOUGH. But no political and territorial settlement alone will be capable of solving the great problems Yugoslavia will face at the end of the war. It is estimated that the Yugoslavs have suffered proportionately higher casualties and property loss than any other people involved in the war as the price of their guerrilla warfare against the Axis, civil war, and the Germans' determination to leave the South Slavs permanently weakened. It is, therefore, the question of food, relief and economic rehabilitation that will have priority among the Yugoslavs once the Germans are driven out. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the government-in-exile has promised Tito it will pay particular attention to preparations for the reconstruction of the country after the war "in harmony and collaboration with competent institutions and organizations of the United Nations." During the period of relief and reconstruction Yugoslavia will turn to UNRRA and private American relief projects, for Russia—despite its great prestige in the Balkans—will be able to offer little economic aid to its neighbors.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

JUST PUBLISHED—

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE VOTER

by Vera Micheles Dean


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Washington News Letter



SENATE ATTITUDE IMPORTANT FACTOR AT DUMBARTON OAKS

Whatever decision is reached at Dumbarton Oaks, and at the subsequent conference of the United Nations which is to produce a final draft agreement for a world security organization, will probably receive the approval of the governments of Britain, Russia and China, despite fundamental differences in their political structure. The United States government, however, can accept the decision only after the Senate has approved it according to regular constitutional procedure under which, if the President submits the draft agreement as a treaty, a two-thirds supporting vote would be required. For this reason, the Senate is an absent but powerful partner in the present discussions. The State Department drafted the plan submitted at Dumbarton Oaks only after it had sought to ascertain what measures the Senate would support. For that reason, the visiting delegations have been inclined to accept, in the main, the plan presented by this country.

SENATE'S ATTITUDE UNCERTAIN. Debate in the Senate on September 5 indicated that some Republicans oppose American participation in a security organization that would command the use of force to keep international law and order. Senator Harlan J. Bushfield, Republican, of North Dakota said that the present plan would give the President the power to declare war, and make him "the absolute despot of the American people, a true dictator in all sense [*sic*] of the word."

While probably few Senators would take this oppositionist attitude, the nature of the Senate's vote on the Dumbarton Oaks program is unpredictable. There are already indications that debate will center on a side issue, as it did in the case of the Versailles Treaty—not on whether the United States is to collaborate after the war with its present partners, but whether the Senate is to be a party to every decision made under the prospective system of collaboration. In scouting Bushfield's fears, Senator Vandenberg, Republican, of Michigan said the Senate would have an opportunity to determine in advance the instructions given the United States delegate with regard to voting on questions relating to the use of force. Yet the American plan submitted when the Dumbarton conference opened on August 22 did not specifically call for Senate ratification of each vote cast by the American member of the Council. During August Wendell Willkie advised a number of Congressmen that the President should have power to

use the military forces of the United States in fulfillment of this country's obligations to preserve peace through a system of collective security.

NEED FOR QUICK ACTION. On the issue of continuing Senate participation in the world organization, our traditional domestic concerns collide with our world interests. Throughout the history of the Republic, the Senate has sought to dominate the government's foreign policy decisions, considering this procedure in harmony with the democratic process. Yet, to be effective, a security organization must be able to act quickly, and Senatorial review is often slow. Moreover, the program now being assiduously and sincerely formulated by United Nations diplomats could be defeated by a combination of 33 Senators (two-thirds of the Senate plus one), opposing the Dumbarton Oaks plan either because they object to collective security—as Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat, of Montana stated in a radio debate on September 7—or because they object to lack of provision for continuing Senate participation. With this possibility in mind, Secretary Hull last week arranged to confer with a group of Senators on the results achieved at Dumbarton Oaks.

The attitude of Republican Senators when the vote is taken will provide in some measure a test of the strength of Governor Dewey's party leadership. On August 23 and 24 Mr. Hull conferred on the Dumbarton Oaks plan with John Foster Dulles, Mr. Dewey's representative on international affairs, and Mr. Dulles gave his general approval to the proposals. In an address on foreign policy in Louisville on September 8, Mr. Dewey said that a specific task for this country is to help "establish a world organization in which all nations may share as sovereign equals, to deal with future threats to the peace of the world from whatever source, and on a permanent basis." He made no reference to the question of continuing Senatorial participation, and confined his objections to the Administration's foreign policy, the secrecy which surrounds the negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks, and the possibility that small nations may be denied a voice in the security organization's decisions. In regard to the latter point, it was reported on September 11 that a clause to grant small powers the right to be consulted whenever their forces were to be used to put down aggression is now understood to be in the joint security plan.

BLAIR BOLLES

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